Wednesday, March 23, 2016

Ontario Court of Appeal: No Right to Require Proof of a Will in Solemn Form


In a decision released March 8, 2016 – Neuberger v. York, 2016 ONCA 191 – the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Ontario's  Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) give a person the right to require that a will be proved "in solemn form" before it is subject to probate. 

 

Chaim and Sara Neuberger had two daughters – Edie and Myra.  Chaim's long-standing intention was to provide for his daughters equally on his death.  Chaim died on September 25, 2012 at age 86.  Sara predeceased him.  He left a real estate empire estimated to be worth over $100 million.  Edie and Myra survived him.  Each daughter has adult children.

 

Chaim executed primary and secondary wills in 2004 and again in 2010.  Both sets of wills left his estate to his two daughters and their children.  However, the sets of wills differed in one significant way which allegedly resulted in Myra’s share exceeding Edie’s share by approximately $13 million.  As a result of this unequal sharing, which was contrary to Chaim's stated intention, Edie and her son Adam commenced separate actions challenging the 2010 wills. 

 

Justice Susan Greer of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the will challenges on a motion on the basis that they were barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.  Justice Greer held that Edie was estopped from challenging the validity of the 2010 wills because she delayed in bringing her challenge and had no reasonable explanation for the delay.  Justice Greer also held that the actions that Edie had taken as estate trustee and the prejudice that would ensue from having to unwind the estate freeze and that the respondents would suffer as having taken steps on the basis of the 2010 wills. 

 

Justice Greer also held that Adam should not be allowed to challenge the 2010 wills because he had no independent knowledge of the estate, its assets, previous wills and pertinent information about the estate planning nor did he have a close relationship with his grandfather or a real explanation as to why he left it so late to come forward.

 

The Court of Appeal (Justices Gillese, van Rensburg and Miller) disagreed with the conclusion reached by Justice Greer and allowed the appeal.  The decision of the Court of Appeal was written by Justice Gillese.

 

Justice Gillese examined the nature of the court’s role and jurisdiction in probate cases.  She accepted Justice Maurice Cullity’s explanation that the court’s jurisdiction in probate is inquisitorial.  In other words, the court does not simply adjudicate upon a dispute between the parties.  The court’s function and obligation is to ascertain and pronounce what documents constitute the testator’s last will and that are entitled to be admitted to probate.

 

Justice Gillese then looked at rules 74 and 75 of the Rules.  She held that subrule 75.06(3) plays an important role in contentious estate proceedings.  The subrule provides:  “any person who appears to have a financial interest in an estate may apply for directions, or move for directions in another proceeding under this rule, as to the procedure for bringing any matter before the court.” 

 

In addition, rule 75.01 provides:  “…any person appearing to have a financial interest in an estate may make an application under rule 75.06 to have a testamentary instrument that is being put forward as the last will of the deceased proved in such manner as the court directs.” 

 

Justice Gillese did not accept the proposition that as a general principle an interested person is entitled, as of right, to require that a will be proved in solemn form.  Rather the rule provides such a person the ability to make an application to have the will “proved in such manner as the court directs”.   The two rules read together provide that a court has discretion whether to order that a will be proved, as well as discretion over the manner in which the will is proved. 

 

In the Justice Gillese's  view, an “interested person” must meet some minimal evidentiary threshold before a court will accede to a request that a will be proved.  Otherwise, estates would be exposed to needless expense and litigation. She held that the correct approach was that the applicant must adduce "some evidence" which, if accepted, would call into question the validity of the will or testamentary instrument that was being propounded.

 

Justice Gillese accepted that some decisions have indicated that next of kin are entitled as of right to have the will proved in solemn form.  However, such cases are reflective of a presumption that applies in situations where no certificate of appointment of estate trustee has been issued, rather than a hard and fast rule. 

 

The Court of Appeal also rejected Justice Greer's reasoning dealing with the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.  Justice Greer had relied on three cases as authority for the power to invoke estoppel to bar the will challenge.  However, Justice Gillese held that one of the cases did not offer any authority or support for the notion that the doctrines applied to probate matters.  She found that there is nothing in the jurisprudence to support the extension of the equitable doctrines of estoppel by convention or representation to matters involving validity of a will.   

Regards,

Blair

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