Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co. 2016 SCC 54
In a 5 – 4 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada
dismissed an appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal on whether the Federal
Court had jurisdiction to decide whether the Canadian Transit Co. (the “Company”)
was required to comply with the City of Windsor’s by-law and repair orders.
The Company owns and operates the Canadian half of the
Ambassador Bridge connecting Windsor, Ontario and Detroit,
Michigan. The Company was incorporated in 1921 by An Act to
incorporate the Canadian Transit Co. (the “Act”). The Act empowered
the Company to construct, maintain and operate a general traffic bridge across
the Detroit River, to purchase, lease or otherwise acquire and hold lands for
the bridge and to construct, erect and maintain buildings and other structures
required for the convenient working of traffic to, from and over the
bridge. The Act also declared the works and undertakings of the Company
to be for the general advantage of Canada, triggering federal jurisdiction
under the Constitution Act, 1867.
The Company purchased more than 100 residential properties
in Windsor with the intention of eventually demolishing the houses and using
the land to facilitate the maintenance and expansion of the bridge. Most
of the houses are now vacant and in varying states of disrepair.
The City of Windsor issued repair orders against the properties pursuant
to a municipal by-law. The Company has not complied with the repair
orders.
The parties have been engaged in litigation relating to the
repair orders in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. In addition, the
Company applied to the Federal Court for declarations saying that it has rights
under the Act which supersede the by-law and the repair orders. The City moved to strike the Company’s notice of application on
the ground that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
application. The Federal Court struck the Company’s notice for want of
jurisdiction. The Federal Court of Appeal set aside that decision.
On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Justices
McLachlin, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon held that the Federal
Court does not have jurisdiction to decide whether the City’s by-law applies to
the Company’s properties and that the issue should be decided by the Ontario Superior
Court.
Justices Abella, Moldaver, Côté and Brown dissented.
The majority framed the question this way: The issue
is whether the Federal Court has the jurisdiction to decide a claim that a
municipal by-law is constitutionally inapplicable or inoperative in relation to
a federal undertaking. The majority decision was written by Justice
Karakatsanis.
Justice Karakatsanis wrote that the Federal Court has only
the jurisdiction that has been conferred upon it by statute. It is a
statutory court, without inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the language
of the Federal Courts Act is completely determinative of the scope of
the court’s jurisdiction. The majority held that the role of the Federal Court is
constitutionally limited to administering federal law. The Federal Court
has jurisdiction where a federal statute grants it jurisdiction and where the
claim is for relief made or a remedy sought under an Act of Parliament or
otherwise. The relief must be sought under, and not merely in relation to,
federal law.
In this case, the Company was not seeking relief under an
Act of Parliament or otherwise as required by the Federal Courts Act.
The Company was seeking relief under the Act that created
it. The court held that the Federal Courts Act is not itself a
federal law under which the Company could seek relief. For that right,
parties must look to other federal law. Further, although the Act confers
certain rights and powers on the Company, it does not give the Company any kind
of right of action or right to seek the relief that it was seeking. The
Company in fact was seeking relief under constitutional law, because
constitutional law confers on parties the right to seek a declaration that a law is
inapplicable or inoperative. A party seeking relief under constitutional
law is not seeking relief under an Act of Parliament or otherwise within the
meaning of the Federal Courts Act, therefore the applicable section of
the Federal Courts Act does not grant jurisdiction over the Company’s
application to the Federal Court. As a result, the motion to strike the
Company’s notice of application in the Federal Court must succeed.
There were two separate dissenting reasons – one by Justices
Moldaver, Côté and Brown and a separate set of dissenting reasons by Justice Abella.
Justices Moldaver and Brown held that the Federal Court’s jurisdiction should
be construed broadly and that its purposes are better served by a broad
construction of its jurisdiction. The essential nature of the case is not
relevant to whether the Federal Court has jurisdiction but to whether it should
exercise it. The dissenters held that requiring a federal statute to
expressly create a cause of action before jurisdiction may be founded under an
Act of Parliament was unduly
narrow and inconsistent with Parliament’s intent in creating the Federal
Court. The court’s jurisdiction should be construed broadly so that if
the claim for relief is related to a federal work or undertaking and the rights
being enforced arise from an Act of Parliament, the claimants may approach the
Federal Court.
In separate dissenting reasons, Justice Abella held that the
appeal should be dismissed in part and a stay of the Federal Court proceedings
should be entered. She held that notwithstanding that the Federal Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Ontario Superior Court, it should not exercise it in this
case. Both the Company and the City appealed orders to the Ontario Superior Court. Rather than wait for
the outcome of the appeals before the Superior Court, the Company sought to
activate the Federal Court’s intervention. Justice Abella reasoned that the Company had attempted to
divert the proceedings into a jurisdictional sideshow which added expense and
delay in aid of nothing except avoiding a determination of the merits for as
long as possible. To date that jurisdictional diversion has cost the
public a delay of three years. There was no basis for further delaying
the Superior Court proceedings.
Regards,
Blair
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